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Abstract 
We conduct a field experiment, based on a registered report accepted by the Journal of 
Accounting Research, to test performance effects of setting a high reference point for peer-
performance comparison. Relative to providing the median as a reference point for online 
students to compare themselves to, providing the top quartile: damps performance for those 
below the median; boosts performance for those between the median and top quartile; and, in the 
case of outcome but not process comparison, boosts performance for those above the top 
quartile. We do not find that either reference point yields a greater average performance effect. 
However, providing the more effective reference point in each partition of initial performance 
yields a 40% greater performance effect than providing either reference point uniformly. 
Students access the online courses intermittently over the span of a year. Our effects derive from 
small portions of our treatment groups—5% in the case of process comparison and 26% in the 
case of outcome comparison—who accessed treatment and who were, on average, more active 
leading up to and during our intervention.    
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1. INTRODUCTION
We test performance effects of setting a high reference point in relative performance information 
(RPI). RPI shows how one is performing relative to peers and motivates performance in a variety 
of settings, including when performance is not tied to pay (Allcott [2011], Hannan, Krishnan, 
and Newman [2008], Tafkov [2013]). Theories of social comparison, reference points, 
expectancy, and goals could help explain performance effects of the height of reference points 
that are commonly displayed in RPI.1 Insight into performance effects of RPI reference point 
height could guide the many government, nonprofit, and corporate administrators who use RPI 
(e.g., Blanes i Vidal and Nossol [2011], Hallsworth et al. [2017], Song et al. [2017]). However, 
empirical evidence on these performance effects is lacking.  
We provide such evidence using a field experiment, based on a registered report accepted 
by the Journal of Accounting Research, in online education. Our research builds on recent field 
studies that suggest that the peer median reference point does not motivate above-median 
performers to improve (Allcott [2011], Chen et al. [2010], Schultz et al. [2007]). We extend 
these studies by testing whether a higher reference point, the top quartile, has a different 
performance effect. By comparing the median and top quartile as reference points, we assess 
reference points that RPI designers often provide and that RPI literature has focused attention on 
(Bizjak, Lemmon, and Nguyen [2011], Chen et al. [2010], Gong, Li, Shin [2011], Grote [2005]).  
In our field experiment, we offer RPI with either of these two reference points, each 
correctly labeled as the median or top quartile, for a period of two months to students in online 
courses. We use data on a range of actions in the courses and a record of each time a given 
student accesses RPI. The field setting and our intervention do not involve explicit incentives for 
1  We study reference points that are percentiles of the peer-performance distribution. We use the term “RPI 
reference point height” to refer to how high a percentile of the distribution is provided as a reference point in RPI.   
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performance, which helps us to identify the distinct information effects of RPI reference point 
height.  
RPI and reference points work through multiple forces to influence performance. RPI 
allows peer comparison and so activates innate incentives to attain a positive self-image by 
outperforming peers (Smith [2000], Brown et al. [2007]). A reference point instils loss aversion 
in those who fall short and so motivates them to work to reach the reference point (Abeler et al. 
[2011], Allen et al. [2017]). Expectancy theory adds a qualification on the incentives that RPI 
and reference points produce; a level of performance must seem attainable to motivate 
improvement (Atkinson [1957]). We draw on these and related theories to predict performance 
effects of providing a higher RPI reference point than the median.2  
As planned in our registered report proposal, we assess both an average performance 
effect as well as performance effects in cross sections of our sample. Theory suggests that 
providing a higher, rather than lower, reference point will most positively affect the performance 
of individuals who are initially between the two alternatives. This implies a concave relationship 
between the positive performance effect of reference point height and an individual’s initial 
performance.  
We find the predicted concave relationship. Relative to providing the median in RPI as a 
reference point, providing the top quartile: damps performance for those below the median; 
boosts performance for those between the median and top quartile; and, in the case of RPI on an 
outcome measure but not a process measure, boosts performance for those above the top quartile.   
To understand the mixed results for top-quartile performers, we draw on survey evidence 
on the outcome and process measures in our study. The outcome measure, Grade, is the 
                                                
2  Festinger [1954] and Smith [2000] address foundational theory regarding social comparison, Kahneman and 
Tversky [1979] regarding reference points and loss aversion, and Atkinson [1957] and Vroom [1964] regarding 
expectancy-based motivation. 
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percentage of problems a student has answered correctly. The process measure, Activity Level, is 
a weighted sum of a student’s actions in the course, such as logins and video views. We find 
persistent (diminished) interest in outperforming peers toward higher levels of Grade (Activity 
Level). These responses align with social comparison theory. Outcome comparisons that reflect 
ability tend to encourage competition to rise well above the median (Smith [2000], Tafkov 
[2013]). Behavior and process comparisons tend to discourage substantial deviation from the 
median (Allcott [2011], Chen et al. [2010], Dolan et al. [2012]).  
Our display of the top-quartile reference point for Grade could motivate top-quartile 
performers to further exceed it because they desire to distinguish themselves significantly by that 
measure. By contrast, our display of the top-quartile reference point for Activity Level might not 
yield such a performance response because top-quartile performers feel it is not important, and 
perhaps suboptimal, to be so far from the norm of a process measure. This theoretical discussion 
goes beyond our initial proposal to shed light on our unplanned comparison of Grade RPI and 
Activity Level RPI.   
We did not plan tests of Grade RPI in our approved proposal, though the referee 
suggested them prior to the proposal’s approval, because our field site did not expect to be able 
to provide the necessary data. We later received the necessary data. We present our planned 
hypothesis tests of Activity Level RPI in section 4.3 and present the same tests applied to Grade 
RPI in section 4.4. In section 4.5, we compare our results for RPI on each measure and discuss 
the comparisons.  
In a planned supplementary analysis, we find that a small portion of our treatment groups 
accessed RPI—5.6% for Activity Level RPI and 26.09% for Grade RPI. We conduct unplanned 
analysis into possible reasons for low treatment access rates. Students use the courses 
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intermittently over the span of a year; those not active around the time of our two-month 
intervention would be less exposed to and might be less interested in the treatment. We find that, 
relative to students who did not access their course in the month leading up to our intervention, 
those who did were more than twice as likely to access RPI. Moreover, 21.48% (75.24%) of 
treatment-group students who were active on more than 10 days during our intervention accessed 
Activity Level (Grade) RPI.  
Along with intermittent course access, another explanation for low RPI access rates 
seems based in the topic of RPI. Students are less likely to access Activity Level RPI than Grade 
RPI. Social comparison theory suggests that interest in Grade RPI might be greater because it 
incorporates accuracy and so reveals more about relative ability (Smith [2000], Tafkov [2013]). 
The low treatment access rates in our study raise a few important considerations in 
interpreting our results. First, as in RPI research we draw on, our results derive from a small 
portion of individuals who accept the offer to view RPI and who are more engaged in the task 
leading up to and during performance reporting (Chen et al. [2010]). Second, limited treatment 
access reduces the sizes of effect estimates. For students who accessed treatment, we estimate 
greater effect sizes and show these in the online appendix. Third, different treatment access rates 
for Grade RPI and Activity Level RPI could partly explain the mixed results among top-quartile 
performers. We discuss in section 5 how these results could arise if treatment-group portions that 
access Grade RPI are inherently more competitive than those that access Activity Level RPI.  
We use planned supplementary analyses beyond the topic of treatment access to further 
explore causes and conditions of our main results. Our survey evidence shows less confidence in 
one’s ability to reach the top quartile than the median. Combined with expectancy theory, this 
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evidence suggests that low performers may respond better to the lower reference point in part 
because they question their ability to reach the higher reference point.   
In another planned supplementary analysis, we test whether gender moderates 
performance responses to RPI reference points. Research shows gender differences in the 
performance effect of peer comparison that occurs through interaction with a high-performing 
peer (Lavy, Silva, and Weinhardt [2012]). We do not find gender differences in the performance 
effect of peer comparison that occurs through display of a high RPI reference point. We state a 
confidence interval for this null result and discuss possible explanations, including a lack of 
statistical power, in the online appendix. One possible explanation is that gender differences in 
response to interaction with a high performing peer depend on the identifiability of that peer and 
related chances to cooperate (Cross and Madson [1997], Eagly [1978]), which anonymous RPI 
reference points do not offer.  
Our study makes three main contributions. First, we show effects of RPI reference point 
height that operate through the display of anonymous performance information. This speaks to 
the growing body of economic and psychology research on this type of information display as a 
tool for influencing performance and behavior. This research spans the private and public sectors 
and shows that RPI affects retail service, educational attainment, energy consumption, web-site 
content contribution, and taxpaying. 3  Research on the importance of the reference point 
displayed along with RPI could have policy implications for a variety of corporate and other 
societal settings.  
Second, we extend accounting research on moderating conditions of RPI’s performance 
effects. Accounting research has addressed conditions that include financial compensation, 
                                                
3  See Blanes i Vidal and Nossol [2011] regarding retail and wholesale, Azmat and Iriberri [2010] regarding 
education, Allcott [2011] and Schultz et al. [2007] regarding energy consumption, Chen et al. [2010] regarding web-
site content contribution, and Hallsworth et al. [2017] regarding taxpaying.     
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anonymity, information detail, and multitasking (Hannan, Krishnan, and Newman [2008], 
Hannan et al. [2013, 2017], Newman and Tafkov [2014], Tafkov [2013]). We contribute to these 
studies by addressing the height of reference points. Given the prevalence of reference points in 
applications of RPI, reference point height is a salient feature to provide evidence on (Bizjak, 
Lemmon, and Nguyen [2011], Song et al. [2017]).    
Third, analysis of the effects of RPI reference points in isolation informs theory and 
empirical work in a variety of other streams of research. Research on RPI-related accounting and 
economic mechanisms might draw from our results in a number of ways.4 For example, we find 
weak returns to RPI reference point height relative to those that other studies have shown to goal 
or target height in the absence of RPI (Erez and Zidon [1984], Locke and Latham [2002]). A 
partial explanation for the prevalence of achievable targets could be that targets often serve as 
reference points in RPI and, in that role, introduce some of the negative performance responses 
to RPI reference point height that we find.5 Also, tournament literature notes the problem of 
motivating those who are very far below or above a rewarded cutoff (Asch [1990], Casas-Arce 
and Martinez-Jerez [2009]). Our analysis shows an alternative approach to performance 
management—providing a lower reference point to low performers and, in the case of outcome-
based performance, a higher reference point to high performers. Furthermore, evidence on the 
performance returns to RPI reference point height could inform prediction of the effects of 
supervisor discretion in setting targets that communicate RPI (Bol et al. [2010]). Lastly, RPI 
                                                
4 For examples of such RPI-related mechanisms, see Aranda, Arellano, and Dávila [2014], Bol et al. [2010], and 
Murphy [2000] regarding target setting, Securities and Exchange Commission [2015] regarding disclosure and 
monitoring, and Gibbons and Roberts [2012] regarding contracting.  	
5 See Merchant and Manzoni [1989] for an overview of positive returns to goals and targets achievable less than 
50% of the time, and the contrasting prevalence of more achievable targets in practice. Bouwens and Kroos [2011], 
and Leone and Rock [2002] also find highly achievable targets in practice. Merchant and Manzoni [1989] and 
Ioannou, Li, and Serafeim [2016] discuss rationales for highly achievable targets despite evidence of returns to 
target height. Aranda, Arellano, and Dávila [2014] and Bol et al. [2010] are examples of the use of targets along 
with RPI.  
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reference points, especially the median and top quartile, are commonly used in measuring 
corporate performance and evaluating employees.6 Research in those settings might use our 
results to account for behavioral responses to the display of RPI reference points.   
 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Economics-based research addresses functions of RPI that explain its widespread use (Gibbons 
and Roberts [2012] p. 67). Principals use RPI to filter out common noise from a performance 
measure so that it imposes less risk on an agent in an incentive contract (Banker and Datar 
[1989], Holmstrom [1979], Lazear and Rosen [1981]). Agents use RPI to form expectations of 
pay for marginal effort based on their proximity to relative-performance cutoffs in nonlinear 
incentive schemes (Asch [1990], Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez [2009], Hannan, Krishnan, and 
Newman [2008]).  
Recent research outlines an additional role of RPI, in which RPI influences performance 
even in the absence of incentive contracts. Studies show generally positive performance effects 
of providing RPI in fixed-pay, piece-rate-pay, and no-pay contexts (Azmat and Iriberri [2010], 
Murthy [2010], Tafkov [2013]).  
In many applications, RPI includes reference points for peer comparison, often peer-
median performance (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol [2011], Chen et al. [2010]). Like RPI, reference 
points can influence effort above and beyond the rate of pay for marginal performance. Recent 
economic studies incorporate reference points in models of utility that traditionally only weigh 
monetary pay-off and cost of effort. In positively weighting a reference point, utility functions 
                                                
6 See Bebchuk and Fried [2005], Bizjak, Lemmon, and Nguyen [2011], and Securities and Exchange Commission 
[2015] regarding comparison of executive compensation and corporate performance to peer group percentiles, and 
Berger, Harbring, and Sliwka [2013] and Grote [2005] regarding employee evaluation involving peer group 
percentiles.   
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account for “reference-dependent preferences” (Abeler et al. [2011], Farber [2008]). Although 
RPI and reference points can both motivate effort, little is known regarding the effect of RPI 
combined with reference points of varying heights. 
A number of field studies report generally positive performance effects of RPI display 
but do not test the performance effects of varying the height of reference points (Allcott [2011], 
Allcott and Rogers [2014], Azmat and Iriberri [2010], Chen et al. [2010], Schultz et al. [2007]). 
These studies show performance effects that depend on initial performance relative to the 
reference point; individuals underperforming a reference point exhibit a more positive 
performance response than those outperforming it. Researchers suggest that this may be due to 
the difficulty of achieving beyond an already high level or to a downwardly attractive power of 
reference points for those performing above them (Allcott [2011]), Schultz et al. [2007]). A 
potential implication is that a higher reference point, relative to which individuals would be 
situated differently, would yield different performance effects. 
Theories of social comparison, reference points, goals, and expectancy explain how RPI 
and reference points influence performance. We addressed each theory in our initial proposal and 
include the same insights from each here to provide context for our predictions of the 
performance effect of RPI reference point height.  
Social comparison theory explains how RPI drives performance. RPI adds a performance 
incentive in the form of utility from comparing favorably to peers (Brown et al. [2007], Garcia 
and Tor [2007], Tafkov [2013]). This incentive cuts across a variety of contexts. RPI drives 
performance with or without performance-based pay, whether peers are identifiable or 
anonymous, and whether one’s performance is visible to others or kept private (Hannan, 
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Krishnan, and Newman [2008], Klar and Giladi [1997], Tafkov [2013], Xiao and Lucking 
[2008]).  
Reference points, or levels for comparison to, follow principles of behavioral economics 
in influencing performance (Heath, Larrick, and Wu [1999]). Individuals feel loss aversion to 
falling short of a reference point and so try to reach it. Economic models of utility that account 
for reference points incorporate a loss aversion term, and a lab study shows that providing a 
reference point for expectations of total pay lifts effort toward the level necessary to achieve the 
given level of pay (Abeler et al. [2011]). Reference points for effort provision can also arise 
separately from financial contracts. For instance, runners exert effort near the end of a marathon 
to finish a few seconds before a round number time (Allen et al. [2017], Markle et al. [2015]). 
Whether a reference point is introduced, as in performance management interventions like ours, 
or arises naturally, as with a round number, researchers use loss aversion to explain its ability to 
boost performance (Abeler et al. [2011], Allen et al. [2017]). We take this same theoretical 
approach.  
Expectancy theory states that motivation to achieve a level of performance depends on its 
“expectancy,” or perceived attainability (Atkinson [1957], Lawler and Suttle [1973], Vroom 
[1964]). Goal theory similarly notes that perceived attainability is fundamental to a goal’s ability 
to motivate performance (Erez and Zidon [1984], Locke, Motowidlo, and Bobko [1986]). We 
consider in our hypotheses how the level of expectancy of the RPI reference points we test could 
influence their performance effects.  
An additional motivator present in our study and in a variety of corporate and public-
sector settings is a visual indication of approval for performing well relative to a peer reference 
point (Allcott [2011], Campbell [2006], Vanek Smith [2015]). Examples from these settings 
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include red and green colors to signal low and high performance, respectively, and smiley faces 
to signal high performance. We adopt smiley faces, as used in field experiments from 
psychology and economics, to test the performance effects of RPI reference points when 
outperforming them is visually congratulated (Allcott [2011], Schultz et al. [2007]).  
 Hypothesis 1 through hypothesis 3c are stated here exactly as in our approved proposal. 
Hypothesis 1 regards the validity of our intervention as a performance management tool. We 
state our hypotheses in the alternative form.  
 
H1: Providing relative performance information with a congratulated descriptive norm 
reference point for peer comparison positively affects performance.  
 
We incorporate theories of RPI and reference points in developing Hypotheses 2a-3c, 
which relate to RPI reference point height. While we do so more succinctly than in the approved 
proposal, in line with feedback from the referee and editor, the theories lead us to the same 
predictions.  
We predict a concave relationship between an individual’s initial performance and the 
performance effect of providing the top quartile, rather than median, reference point. We address 
the predicted concavity among partitions of initial performance, from low to high.  
We predict a negative effect of providing the top-quartile, rather than median, reference 
point to initially below-median performers. Reference points offer lower marginal utility to effort 
when farther away, and so the top-quartile reference point would offer this group lower marginal 
utility than would the median (Abeler et al. [2011], Heath, Larrick, and Wu [1999], Kahneman 
and Tversky [1979], Markle et al. [2015]). The higher reference point would also hold lower 
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expectancy, a key element of motivation (Atkinson [1957]). From a social comparison theory 
standpoint, upward comparison to a distant level of high performance has been shown to 
discourage effort (Rogers and Feller [2015]). Research on tournaments and rank-based pay 
similarly suggests that individuals are discouraged to the point of giving up when they feel that a 
nonlinearly rewarded level of performance is too high (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul [2013]).  
On the other hand, reference point research implies one advantage of the higher reference 
point among below-median performers. Individuals who surpass the median might be drawn 
higher still by the higher reference point (Abeler et al. [2011], Heath, Larrick, and Wu [1999], 
Reno, Cialdini, and Kallgren [1993]). The balance of theory, though, suggests that the higher 
reference point will be less motivating than the lower reference point among below-median 
performers.  
For those initially between the two reference points, providing the top-quartile, rather 
than median, reference point is more likely to boost performance. The top-quartile reference 
point is more attainable, and so holds a higher degree of expectancy, for the 50th—75th-percentile 
performers than for below-median performers. The top-quartile reference point also rewards 
effort for all individuals in this partition in the form of reduced feelings of loss from 
underperforming the reference point. The median reference point, by contrast, offers such utility 
only to those who fall below the median (Abeler et al. [2011]). We note that many studies show 
the relevance of the median as a reference point and we can find fewer that address the top 
quartile (Dolan et al. [2012], Larrick, Burson, and Soll [2007]). Other than the related possibility 
of greater innate interest in and desires to outperform the median reference point, theory suggests 
a positive performance effect of providing the higher, rather than lower, reference point to 
initially 50th—75th-percentile performers.  
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In the top-quartile of initial performance, a few forces could cause the higher reference 
point to be more motivating than the lower. Top-quartile performers are more likely to fall 
beneath the higher reference point. The prospect and instance of that event might yield stronger 
performance incentives. Also, to the extent that RPI reference points carry downward attractive 
power, a higher reference point might act as a bulwark to mitigate a performance decline 
(Schultz et al. [2007]). However, evidence of a downward attractive force of RPI reference 
points is mixed (Allcott [2011], Chen et al. [2010]).  
A few forces could, by contrast, cause the higher reference point to be less motivating 
than the lower in the top-quartile of initial performance. The higher reference point reveals to 
top-quartile performers that they are in the right tail of the performance distribution. This could 
cause them to feel complacent or to worry that their behavior is suboptimal (Schultz et al. 
[2007]). Also, if the median generates more interest in social comparison than the top quartile, 
this could lead to greater effort to perform well by the comparison (Dolan et al. [2012], Larrick, 
Burson, and Soll [2007]). We predict a positive effect of providing the top-quartile, as opposed 
to median, reference point among initially top-quartile performers despite some theory to the 
contrary. The more uniform predictions from related theories are for a performance benefit of 
reference point height among individuals initially performing between two alternatives. We 
predict that these individuals will respond more positively on average to reference point height 
than will those initially above the higher reference point. 
To address how our study differs from studies of goal difficulty we add theory beyond 
that included in our approved proposal. Research on goals—explicitly stated objects or aims of 
an activity—generally reports that the more difficult the goal, the higher the performance, even 
to the point at which less than 25% of individuals achieve the goal (Erez and Zidon [1984], 
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Locke and Latham [2002], Locke, Motowidlo, and Bobko [1986]). We test for an average 
performance effect of RPI reference point height at similar levels of attainability, but do not 
predict its sign because RPI reference points reveal information beyond the information in goals.  
In particular, RPI reference points reveal information on relative performance and social 
norms. As we noted earlier in this section, a comparison to high-performing peers might cause 
low performers to feel discouraged and high performers to feel complacent or that they are 
deviating in a suboptimal way from social norms. These possibilities drive our predictions of a 
concave relationship between initial performance and RPI reference point height, whereas 
studies show positive returns to goal difficulty across spectrums of initial performance and 
ability (Erez and Zidon [1984], Latham, Seijts, and Crim [2008]). A mix of negative and positive 
effects of RPI reference point height might yield no or even a negative average effect, unlike the 
positive average effect found for goal difficulty.  
Hypotheses 2a-c predict the effect of providing the top-quartile, rather than median, 
reference point in each partition of initial performance addressed above. We predict opposing 
effects among partitions that may balance out or yield a net effect. As a result, we test for but do 
not predict the net effect.7 
 
 H2a: Presenting the peer top quartile, as opposed to the peer median, as a congratulated 
reference point for performance negatively affects the performance of individuals who are 
initially below both reference points.  
                                                
7 The approved registered report proposal similarly noted that we would test for but not predict the occurrence or 
sign of a net effect of providing the top-quartile, rather than median, reference point. We included in that proposal a 
hypothesis 4 right after that statement with the alternative of an effect and a null of no effect. We agree with 
subsequent feedback that stating a hypothesis without a prediction of an effect’s occurrence or sign was a deviation 
from the regular meaning of a hypothesis. We thus now only state that we will test for a net effect despite not 
making a prediction of the net effect. 
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 H2b: Presenting the peer top quartile, as opposed to the peer median, as a congratulated 
reference point for performance positively affects the performance of individuals who are 
initially between both reference points.  
 
H2c: Presenting the peer top quartile, as opposed to the peer median, as a congratulated 
reference point for performance positively affects the performance of individuals who are 
initially above both reference points.  
 
H3a-c address the concave relationship between initial performance and returns to a 
higher reference point that H2a-c imply. H3a predicts a more positive performance effect of 
providing the higher, rather than lower, reference point for those initially between than outside 
the alternative reference points. H3b (H3c) predicts a more positive effect in the in-between 
partition than in the lower (higher), which helps to further define the shape of performance 
returns to a higher reference point along the scale of initial performance.   
 
 H3a: The performance effect of presenting the peer top quartile, as opposed to the peer 
median, as a congratulated reference point for performance is more positive for those who are 
initially between median and top-quartile performance than for those who are not. 
 
H3b: The performance effect of presenting the peer top quartile, as opposed to the peer 
median, as a congratulated reference point for performance is more positive for those who are 
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initially between median and top-quartile performance than for those who are initially below 
median performance. 
 
H3c: The performance effect of presenting the peer top quartile, as opposed to the peer 
median, as a congratulated reference point for performance is more positive for those who are 
initially between median and top-quartile performance than for those who are initially above top-
quartile performance.   
 
3.  FIELD SETTING AND DATA 
3.1 Field Setting 
In 2012, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University jointly founded 
edX, a nonprofit organization offering free online courses, assessments, and certificates for 
higher education. HarvardX, our study’s field site, is the constituent organization of edX that 
offers courses from Harvard University faculty members. Enrollment is open globally and with 
no prerequisites or application. All instruction occurs online. Course topics range from literature 
to statistics, and courses are open for periods ranging from a few weeks to a full year. We 
conducted experiments in four statistics courses that ranged in enrollment from roughly 6,000 to 
25,000.  
3.2 Experiment Design 
Our study’s experiment design consists of a control group, which received no RPI display, and 
two treatment groups. One treatment group received an RPI display with the peer median 
reference point and the other received an RPI display with the peer top-quartile reference point. 
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A student’s RPI display showed his or her performance relative to a single reference point, 
correctly labeled as either the median or top quartile. 
We provided students in each of the two treatment groups with access to RPI for a period 
of two months. We delivered the RPI using weekly emails that led a student to his or her RPI 
display. To increase exposure to the intervention, we placed a link reading “Check your 
progress” within the course platform. The link directed control-group students who clicked it to 
the default HarvardX progress chart for the course, which showed completion status of 
individual assignments and no RPI. The link directed treatment-group students who clicked it to 
their RPI, below which sat a link to the default HarvardX progress chart for the course. We 
updated the displays daily. Appendix B contains example displays. 
We initially proposed using Activity Level, as opposed to Grade, as the measure of 
performance. Our choice of the former was driven by data availability; HarvardX could not 
provide the necessary data at the time our proposal was approved.  
The referee, though, encouraged us to test RPI regarding Grade. The referee noted that 
individuals might desire to rise to the high tail of the distribution of an outcome measure, like 
Grade, that reflects ability but not of a process measure, like Activity Level, that focuses more on 
effort. We describe related theory in section 4.5. After the proposal’s approval, we gained access 
to data that allowed providing RPI on the outcome measure Grade. We ran the experiment as 
approved, with Activity Level RPI, and then modified, with Grade RPI. We refer to the former as 
the “main experiment” and the latter as the “supplemental experiment.”  
3.3 Data 
Our study benefits from intricate student-course-level data. Quantitative data include each 
student’s number of clicks on course content, number of days on which they were active in the 
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course, number of video views, number of discussion forum posts, Grade, and several other 
measures of activity in the course. Qualitative data include student demographics and responses 
to surveys.  
 Activity Level is an aggregate measure of how active a student is in a course. 
Specifically, the measure is a weighted sum of activities: accessing the course, clicking on 
content, watching videos, interacting in the discussion forum, and attempting problems. The 
weight applied to each activity approximately scales the activity’s historical mean to the 
historical mean of video views. We measured historical means using data from past iterations of 
the host courses.  
 Grade represents the percentage of the course’s total problems that the student answered 
correctly. Students can complete problems in any order. This facilitates flexible, modular 
learning. The low mean Grade for students who have attempted problems does not reflect 
equally low accuracy, but rather students selecting which problems they will attempt and their 
imperfect accuracy on those attempts. We used Grade rounded to the nearest whole percent (e.g., 
82% rather than 82.12%), and Activity Level rounded to the nearest integer (e.g., 19 rather than 
18.74), for display during the experiments and in the analysis.8 
Appendix A contains a full list of variable definitions. The dependent variable in the 
main experiment is Δ Activity Level and, in the supplemental experiment, Δ Grade.9 We use the 
other variables in the same manner in the supplemental experiment as in the main experiment. 
                                                
8 We did not specify rounding in the accepted proposal, but the rounding occurred before the experiments were run 
and prior to analysis. We gained access to Grade after the proposal’s acceptance and only in a rounded format—the 
format that our host courses use in reporting Grade to students. We rounded Activity Level in order to use graphical 
display software that only accepted integers. Performance measures are often shown as an integer or integer 
percentage, and so our study aligns with practice in that respect (e.g., Bizjak, Lemmon, and Nguyen [2011], Chen et 
al. [2010], Grote [2005]).  
9 We calculate Activity Level and Grade at the end of both experiments but only calculate Δ Activity Level and Δ 
Grade for the respective experiments wherein each is the dependent variable. This is due to limitations on the 
longitudinal history in our raw data source for each when it is not the dependent variable. It is outside the scope of 
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 4. ANALYSIS 
4.1 Analytical Approach 
Our study draws both from null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) and Bayesian analysis. 
We conduct NHST for each hypothesis. We calculate Bayes factors when we fail to reject a null 
hypothesis. Bayesian analysis makes use of effects that are not significant at traditional levels by 
explaining how much more probable we can expect a significant relation to be than we could 
before the realization of the data.  
We apply guidance from research on RPI and online settings in selecting our sample. One 
empirical challenge is zero-inflation from the large percentage of students who enroll and then 
do not participate in these courses (Lamb et al. [2010]). We exclude these students from our 
study. Of those who access the course, a large number do not try graded content. We exclude 
these students in the supplemental experiment to avoid zero-inflating the displayed standard of 
performance. Chen et al. [2010] make a similar sample restriction to the active portion of an 
online community. 
The influence of a small number of outliers who use an online course approximately 10 
times more than the 99th percentile poses another empirical challenge (Lamb et al. [2010]). We 
winsorize values for Activity Level at the 99th percentile, as specified in our proposal, to ensure 
that a small number of extreme outliers do not drive or offset results.10 For consistency, we 
perform the same winsorization on any components of Activity Level used as dependent 
                                                                                                                                                       
this paper to show how Δ Activity Level and Δ Grade correlate. However, by including Activity Level and Grade in 
the descriptive statistics for each experiment, we show how these performance measures generally correlate in the 
host courses.  
10 Our results hold at the same level of significance when we exclude individuals above the 99th percentile of 
Activity Level, or its components when used as dependent variables, rather than winsorizing at the 99th percentile.   
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variables in unplanned analyses. Winsorization is not necessary for Grade, which is capped at 
100.  
We cluster standard errors at the student level to correct for autocorrelation from students 
who enroll in more than one host course for the experiment. Any students present in more than 
one course are included in the same experimental group in all courses. Their experimental group 
membership is, as with all students, set through random assignment.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 1 and 2 show the sample selection and descriptive statistics for the main and 
supplemental experiments, respectively. The courses attract individuals who are on average in 
their thirties. The majority are male, have at least a bachelor’s degree, and live in a developed 
country. Of those who responded to the pre-course survey, the average student is somewhat to 
very familiar with the course content and intends to complete at least some course content.  
Turning to performance, the average Activity Level at the beginning of the main 
experiment was 96.5. An example student with that activity profile who had a typical distribution 
of activity among course elements would, at the experiment’s start, have been active in the 
course on three days, watched 15 videos, made one discussion forum post, taken six other actions 
in the discussion forum, tried nine problems, and made 160 clicks on course content. Activity 
Level rose to an average of 117.73 at the experiment’s end, a roughly 22% increase in the 
weighted component measures.  
Grade stood at an average of 19.02 at the supplemental experiment’s start and rose by 
2.63 to an average of 21.65 at the experiment’s end—a roughly 14% increase. A student’s Grade 
starts at zero and rises with each question correctly answered. The maximum possible Grade is 
100.  
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Tables 3 and 4 show a planned supplementary analysis in which we find limited 
treatment access. 5.6% (26.09%) of the treatment groups in our experiment regarding Activity 
Level (Grade) RPI access the RPI. We do not find that the number of students who return to 
access RPI more than once depends on the reference point that we provide. The courses are self-
paced, and students access the courses intermittently; the average number of days between 
course access is 16, or over one-fourth of the length of our intervention. We note in section 1 that 
unplanned analyses show that those who are more active in the courses leading up to and during 
the intervention are more likely to access treatment. Treatment access is also more common for 
Grade RPI than Activity Level RPI. We describe implications of treatment access in section 1 
and section 5.  
Our hypotheses compare performance among cells of initial performance and assigned 
treatment. Table 5 (table 6) displays these cells in a grid for Δ Activity Level (Δ Grade). These 
tables show the values of the dependent variables in cells that we compare in our hypothesis 
tests.  
Figures 1 and 2 depict the distributions of our dependent variables by initial performance 
and reference point. Below the median of initial performance, individuals shown the median 
reference point perform best. Between the median and top quartile of initial performance, 
individuals shown the top-quartile reference point perform best. For initially top-quartile 
performers in the case of Activity Level RPI, those shown the median reference point perform 
best. For initially top-quartile performers in the case of Grade RPI, those shown the top-quartile 
reference point perform best. These graphs help to visualize the dependent variable descriptive 
statistics prior to formal hypothesis tests. 
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We address our planned hypothesis tests in section 4.3. In section 4.4, we apply those 
same hypotheses to the unplanned, supplemental experiment by using Grade as the measure of 
performance instead of Activity Level. In section 4.5, we report additional analyses based on 
planned supplementary tests as well as unplanned tests.  
4.3 Tests of Planned Hypotheses  
Table 7 shows tests of our planned hypotheses. We conduct the tests using a planned OLS 
specification and also using an unplanned cell-means specification that yields the same results, 
i.e. the same rejections of null hypotheses with the same estimate magnitudes significant at the 
same levels. We include the cell-means specification in the main text in response to feedback 
that we should more clearly link cells of treatment and initial performance to hypotheses and 
results. We show the OLS specification in the online appendix.  
The first row of table 7 shows evidence to support H1, that providing RPI boosts 
performance. With H2a, H2b, and H2c, we predicted that providing the top-quartile, rather than 
median, reference point would damp performance for those initially below the median, boost 
performance for those initially between the reference points, and boost performance for those 
initially above the top quartile, respectively. We show evidence to support H2a (H2b) in the 
second (third) row of table 7. The evidence in the fourth row does not support H2c. We calculate 
a Bayes factor of over 20 that provides a strong indication, by the standards of Kass and Raftery 
[1995], that providing the top-quartile, rather than median, reference point damps performance 
for those initially above the top quartile.11 In section 4.5, we discuss how our survey evidence 
and theory related to interest in outperforming peers could help to explain this result.  
                                                
11 We calculate Bayes factors for the main hypothesis tests when the tests yield a null result. These are referenced in 
the main text and shown in the online appendix. 
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 The fifth row of table 7 supports the prediction from H3a of a concave relationship 
between initial performance and the positive performance effect of displaying the higher, rather 
than lower, reference point. Specifically, the performance effect is more positive for those 
initially between the reference points than outside them. The sixth row of table 7 supports H3b, 
that the performance effect is more positive for those initially between the reference points than 
below the median. The seventh row of table 7 supports H3c, that the performance effect is more 
positive for those initially between the reference points than above the top quartile. Figure 3 
illustrates this concave relationship. The tendency of individuals between the median and top 
quartile to respond competitively to seeing the higher, rather than lower, reference point while 
those on either side tend not to produces a hill shape. 
 We do not find an average performance effect of providing the higher, rather than lower, 
reference point. This test is shown in the last row of table 7. The associated Bayes factor of 3.79 
warrants updating a prior of no relationship in favor of the model’s estimated negative effect to a 
level of 3.79 times the probability before the realization of the data.  
4.4 Tests of Planned Hypotheses Applied to the Unplanned, Supplemental Experiment 
Table 8 shows tests of our planned hypotheses that we apply to the unplanned, supplemental 
experiment by using Grade, rather than Activity Level, as the measure of performance. The first 
row of table 8 shows that providing RPI boosts performance. The second, third, and fourth rows 
show results directionally in line with our predictions for H2a, H2b, and H2c, that providing the 
top-quartile, rather than median, reference point would damp performance for initially below 
median performers, boost performance for those initially between the reference points, and boost 
performance for those initially above the top quartile, respectively. The results of the test for H2b 
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are not statistically significant. The Bayes factor of 2.04 warrants updating the odds of the 
hypothesis as stated to be just over twice as likely as before the realization of the data.  
 The fifth row of table 8 supports the prediction from H3a of a concave relationship 
between initial performance and the positive performance effect of displaying the higher, rather 
than lower, reference point. The sixth row of table 8 supports H3b, that the performance effect is 
more positive for those initially between the reference points than below the median. The 
seventh row of table 8 shows a result directionally in line with H3c, that the performance effect 
is more positive for those initially between the reference points than above the top quartile. The 
result is not statistically significant. The associated Bayes factor of 1.93 for H3c indicates that 
the predicted relationship is just under twice as likely relative to the null of no relationship in 
light of the data. Figure 4 illustrates this concave relationship. The tendency of individuals above 
the median to respond competitively to seeing the higher, rather than lower, reference point 
while those below tend not to produces a plateau shape.  
 We do not find an average performance effect of providing the higher, rather than lower, 
reference point. This test is shown in the last row of table 8. The associated Bayes factor of 2.79 
warrants updating a prior of no relationship in favor of the model’s estimated negative effect to a 
level of 2.79 times the probability before the realization of the data. 
4.5 Additional Analysis 
To understand drivers and conditions of the main effects, we conduct additional analyses. We 
note before each analysis whether it is a planned supplementary analysis or an unplanned 
analysis. In the main text, we provide an overview of each analysis. We refer the reader to the 
online appendix for further detail.  
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We use a planned supplementary analysis to address differences in performance effects 
by gender. Studies of social interaction point to gender as a determinant of cooperativeness 
(Cross and Madson [1997], Eagly [1978]). Recent evidence suggests that females are more prone 
to cooperate and that this leads them to benefit more than males from interaction with high-
performing peers (Lavy, Silva, and Weinhardt [2012]). We do not find evidence that females 
similarly benefit more from comparison to a high reference point of peer performance. This null 
result is consistent with cooperation as a mechanism for gender differences in response to peer 
comparison. An anonymous reference point does not identify a particular high-performing peer 
and for that reason might not lead to differential cooperation and resulting performance effects 
for females and males. In the online appendix, we state a confidence interval for this null result 
and discuss other possible explanations including a lack of statistical power.     
We also conduct a planned supplementary analysis of interest in outperforming peers. 
Table 9 shows that respondents deem it less important to be above the top quartile than the 
median by activity in a course. This aligns with research that shows a tendency to conform to 
normal behavior and processes (Dolan et al. [2012], Schultz et al. [2007]). The results in table 10 
do not show that respondents deem it less important to achieve a grade above the top quartile 
than above the median. This aligns with research that shows a common desire to be of very high 
intellectual ability relative to peers (Smith [2000], Tafkov [2013]).  
This analysis offers a possible explanation for our mixed results among top-quartile 
performers. Individuals who see that they have passed the top quartile of Grade might climb 
higher because of their persistent interest in outperforming peers past high levels of Grade. 
Individuals who see that they have passed the top quartile of Activity Level, on the other hand, 
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might not respond with greater effort because it is not as important to them to be in such a high 
portion of the distribution of that measure.  
In a third planned supplementary analysis, we test confidence in the attainability of the 
two reference points. Tables 9 and 10 show significantly greater confidence in ability to reach 
the median than the top quartile in the case of both activity and grades in a course. Part of the 
reason that those below the median improve more if shown that lower reference point could be 
that it holds greater expectancy from their standpoint.   
We use an unplanned analysis to assess the source of the improvement in Grade in the 
supplemental experiment. We show in the online appendix that Grade RPI led to a higher 
quantity of problems attempted but not a statistically significant increase in the accuracy of 
problem attempts. This suggests an effort, as opposed to aptitude, mechanism for the RPI’s 
performance effect. Theories of reference-dependent preferences for effort provision align with 
this observed effort-based mechanism for the performance effects of Grade RPI (Abeler et al. 
[2011]). 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
Our study contributes most directly to a growing body of literature on the distinct effects of RPI, 
or those separate from pay for or visibility of relative performance (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 
[2011], Chen et al. [2010], Tafkov [2013]). While applications of RPI often include a reference 
point for peer comparison, little to no empirical evidence has established the effects of RPI 
reference point height (Allcott [2011], Chen et al. [2010]).  
 We explain in the abstract and in the introduction and analysis sections that small 
portions of our sample accessed the treatment. As in reference point research that we draw on, 
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our results derive from those who are more engaged in a task leading up to and during 
performance reporting (Chen et al. [2010]). We estimate larger effect sizes for those who access 
RPI and we show these in the online appendix.  
Treatment access could also partly explain the different results for top-quartile 
performers when we show RPI on different measures. Theory suggests that social comparison 
will be more intense the more that RPI reveals about relative ability (Smith [2000]). Competitive 
types might be more prone to view Grade RPI than Activity Level RPI to the extent that the 
former reveals more about relative ability. The portions of our treatment groups that view and 
respond to RPI could be more competitive by nature in the case of Grade RPI. This could occur 
at the same time as interest in outperforming peers generally persists past higher percentiles of 
peer Grade than peer Activity Level, consistent with our survey results. Either of these 
occurrences or their combination could help explain why top-quartile performers respond 
competitively to the top-quartile reference point in the case of Grade but not of Activity Level 
RPI.  
Viewed collectively, our results among partitions of initial performance offer some of the 
first evidence that the performance effect of providing a relatively high RPI reference point 
depends on initial performance. We map out the concave shape of performance returns to RPI 
reference point height along the axis of initial performance. Neither of the reference points we 
test, the median nor top quartile, has a more positive performance effect on average. Our results 
suggest that the optimal approach to providing RPI reference points is to customize the reference 
point to the individual, depending on his or her initial performance. When we show a student the 
more effective of the two reference points as dependent on his or her initial performance and the 
measure of performance, the effect on Δ Activity Level (Δ Grade) is an increase of 5.09 (1.52) 
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from a baseline Activity Level (Grade) of 96.5 (19.02). By contrast, when we show students the 
median reference point in a one-size-fits-all approach, the effect on Δ Activity Level (Δ Grade) is 
an increase of 3.63 (1.06). For Activity Level (Grade) RPI, the customized approach yields a 
roughly 40% (43%) larger effect.  
Our study shows a different response to RPI reference point height than responses other 
studies have shown to goal difficulty or social interaction with high performers. Studies 
generally show net positive performance effects of a high standard for comparison in the form of 
a goal or a high performing peer to interact with.12 We do not find a net positive effect of a 
similarly high RPI reference point. This null result may be due to a lack of statistical power. 
Alternatively, RPI reference points may operate differently than goals and social interaction and 
so yield a different effect.  
Specifically, beyond information inherent in a goal, a high RPI reference point reveals 
information on relative performance and social norms. As we describe in section 2, this 
information could discourage low performers and cause high performers to feel that they should 
regress toward social norms (Rogers and Feller [2015], Schultz et al. [2007]). Also, RPI 
reference points do not directly manipulate one’s peer group and so may not affect learning, 
networking, and cooperation, which studies of social interaction with a high performing peer use 
to explain positive performance effects (Hanushek et al. [2003], Lavy, Silva, and Weinhardt 
[2012], Lyle and Smith [2014]).  
While we study RPI reference points in isolation, our results may inform research in a 
variety of RPI-related areas. For example, targets often either explicitly contain RPI or allow 
inferring one’s relative performance and comparison to a reference point (Aranda, Arellano, and 
                                                
12 See Locke and Latham [2002] for a review of goal literature’s findings on goal difficulty, and see Hanushek et al. 
[2003], Hoxby and Weingarth [2006], Lavy, Silva, and Weinhardt [2012], Lazear [2001], and Lin [2010] for 
evidence of effects of interaction with high-performing peers.  
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Dávila [2014], Bol et al. [2010], Merchant and Manzoni [1989], Murphy [2000]). We find no 
performance benefit on average from setting a high RPI reference point. This offers one possible 
explanation for the prevalence of targets in practice that are achieved by the majority of the 
population most of the time (Merchant and Manzoni [1989]). Through its role as an RPI 
reference point, we would not expect a higher target to yield better performance.  
At the executive level, financial statements list peer-group composition along with 
executive pay relative to target percentiles of the peer group (Bebchuk and Fried [2005], Bizjak, 
Lemmon, and Nguyen [2011]). While the disproportionate prevalence of earning and executive 
pay targets above the peer median has drawn widespread criticism (Bizjak, Lemmon, and 
Nguyen [2011]), we find behavioral responses that suggest relative performance targets set 
above the peer top quartile might motivate performance for individuals in the top half of the 
distribution. Future research could weigh this dynamic along with financial and career concerns 
in assessing the value of high targets for performance and compensation.  
The variation in effects by initial performance also offers insight for research on 
supervisor discretion, tournaments, and employee evaluation. Supervisors are subject to biases 
and political pressures in setting targets and evaluating performance (Bol et al. [2010], Bol 
[2011]). If this lowers or heightens standards for peer performance comparison, our results can 
help to identify the group of initial performers whose performance is most likely to benefit from 
the resulting height of the reference point. Tournament literature shows difficulty in using 
tournament incentives to motivate very low and high performers, and our results suggest that 
providing a customized RPI reference point might motivate these groups. Finally, 29% of 
corporations in a Corporate Executive Board survey reported using forced-curve employee 
rankings for performance management (McGregor [2013]). This type of ranking system 
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sometimes involves the median and top quartile as reference points for peer-performance 
comparison (Grote [2005]). Our study raises behavioral considerations for selecting such 
reference points. If managers have to choose one reference point or the other, they could pick the 
reference point that motivates the group they feel is most important. Our results suggest that it is 
more effective to customize the reference point based on an individual’s initial performance.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Our study provides some of the first evidence of the effect of providing alternatively high 
reference points within RPI. We also show how the effect depends on an individual’s initial 
performance relative to the alternatives. Furthermore, we address the moderating role of 
performance-measure type by testing RPI on a process measure and on an outcome measure. 
 We find that the effect of providing a relatively high reference point in RPI depends on 
one’s initial performance. We test the peer top quartile and the peer median as alternative 
reference points. The effect of providing the higher, rather than lower, reference point is concave 
in initial performance. The effect is negative among below-median performers and positive 
among individuals initially between the alternative reference points. In the case of an outcome-
based performance measure, the effect is also positive for those in the top quartile of 
performance. Collectively, our findings inform the selection of a reference point to drive 
performance in the desired partition of initial performance. The findings also suggest that 
customizing the reference point based on an individual’s initial performance is preferable.  
 Managers and regulators can incorporate these results when selecting RPI reference 
points to yield desired behavior. This is pertinent given the growing role that RPI reference 
points play in such settings as retail, education, energy consumption, and taxpaying. The results 
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also describe incentives resulting from peer comparison and so help in understanding effects of 
performance evaluation and reporting. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variables Description 
Activity Level The following weighted sum, that approximately scales 
each type of action’s historical mean to the historical 
mean of video views in the experiment host courses, 
rounded to the nearest integer: video views + 1.5 x 
problem attempts + 20 x forum posts + 2.5 x other 
forum actions + 5 x number of days active in the course 
+ 0.1 x total actions 
Δ Activity Level Activity Level at the experiment’s end minus Activity 
Level at the experiment’s beginning 
Grade The percentage of the total problems in the course that a 
student has answered correctly, rounded to the nearest 
integer percentage 
Δ Grade Grade at the experiment’s end minus Grade at the 
experiment’s beginning 
Problem Attempts The number of times that a student entered an answer to 
any problem 
Δ Problem Attempts Problem Attempts at the experiment’s end minus 
Problem Attempts at the experiment’s beginning 
Problem-Attempt Accuracy The percentage of problems that a student attempted 
during the experiment, if any, answered correctly 
Dependent Variable Components Description 
Video Views The number of times that a student started watching a video 
Problem Attempts As defined in the dependent variables section 
Forum Posts The number of posts that a student made in discussion 
forums 
Other Forum Actions The number of actions (e.g., voting for a post, 
responding with a comment to a post) a student took in 
discussion forums 
Number of Days Active in the 
Course 
The number of calendar days on which a student 
accessed the course 
Total Actions All actions in the course that are recorded electronically; 
these include logins, video views, problem attempts, 
forum posts, other forum actions, and clicks on course 
material 
Independent Variables Description 
Control An indicator variable equal to one if the individual is 
assigned to the control group, which does not receive 
RPI  
Median Reference Point (RPI_M) An indicator variable equal to one if the individual is 
assigned to the treatment group that receives RPI with 
the peer median reference point for Activity Level 
(Grade) in the main (supplemental) experiment 
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Top-quartile Reference Point 
(RPI_T) 
An indicator variable equal to one if the individual is 
assigned to the treatment group that receives RPI with 
the peer median reference point for Activity Level 
(Grade) in the main (supplemental) experiment 
Relative Performance Information 
(RPI) 
An indicator variable equal to one if either RPI_M = 1 
or RPI_T = 1 
Moderator Variables Description 
Initially Below Median An indicator variable equal to one if the individual’s 
Activity Level (Grade) was less than or equal to the 
median reference point in the main (supplemental) 
experiment 
Initially Third Quartile An indicator variable equal to one if the individual’s 
Activity Level (Grade) was greater than the median and 
less than the top quartile in the main (supplemental) 
experiment 
Initially Top Quartile An indicator variable equal to one if the individual’s 
Activity Level (Grade) was greater than or equal to the 
top quartile in the main (supplemental) experiment 
Gender An indicator variable equal to one (zero) if the 
individual chose Female (Male) as their gender in the 
course registration process 
Developed Country An indicator variable equal to one if the individual 
reported his or her country of residence and the country 
is of UN Developed Nation status, and equal to zero if 
the individual reported his or her country of residence 
and the country is of UN Developing Nation Status 
Level of Education An indicator variable equal to one if the individual 
reported that he or she holds a bachelor’s or higher 
degree 
Age The individual’s age, if any, that he or she reported 
during registration, truncated at 5 and 100 
Descriptive Variables Description 
Familiarity With Subject Response to survey question, “How familiar are you 
with [course name]?” 0 = Not at all Familiar; 1 = 
Slightly Familiar; 2 = Somewhat Familiar; 3 = Very 
Familiar; 4 = Extremely Familiar 
Commitment to Complete Course Response to survey question, “People register for 
HarvardX courses for different reasons. Which of the 
following best describes you?” 1 = Here to browse the 
materials, but not planning on completing any course 
activities (watching videos, reading text, answering 
problems, etc.); 2 = Planning on completing some 
course activities, but not planning on earning a 
certificate; 3 = Planning on completing enough course 
activities to earn a certificate 
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Number of Online Courses 
Previously Enrolled In 
Response to survey question, “How many online 
courses have you registered for in the past?” 
Number of Online Courses 
Previously Completed 
Response to survey question, “How many online 
courses have you completed in the past?” 
34
  
Appendix B: Sample Experiment Instruments 
 
Example Email with Link to RPI Display 
 
 
In the supplemental experiment, the word “Grade” replaces any reference to “Activity.” 
 
 
Example Link in Course to RPI Display 
 
 
 
The link titled, “Check your progress (link will open in a new tab)” takes control-group 
students to the standard course progress chart for HarvardX courses. The same link takes 
treatment group students directly to the proposed experiment’s RPI display that is 
customized to their activity in the course. The RPI display webpage has a link at the bottom 
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titled, “Click here for a more detailed progress chart,” which takes treatment-group 
students to the standard HarvardX course progress chart. 
 
 
RPI Displays 
 
Median Reference Point 
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Top-Quartile Reference Point 
 
 
 
 
In the main experiment, the graphs dynamically scale to show levels of activity above 
150, and start with a default height of 150. The “Click here for a more detailed progress 
chart” link takes treatment group students to the default HarvardX course progress chart. 
In the supplemental experiment, “Grade” replaces any reference to activity or “Activity 
Level,” and the annotations read “classmates who've attempted a problem” rather than 
“classmates.” The graph has a fixed scale from 0–100. 
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Figure 1. 
This  figure  shows  the  mean  Δ Activity Level for each treatment and in each partition of 
initial performance.   These   data   are   from   the   main   experiment,   with   Activity Level   
as  the  displayed measure  of  performance in RPI.    
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Figure 2. 
This figure shows the mean Δ Grade  for each treatment and in each partition of initial 
performance. These data are from the supplemental experiment, with Grade as the 
displayed measure of performance in RPI.
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Figure 3. 
Figure 4. 
This figure plots estimated effects on Δ Activity Level of providing the 
top-quartile rather than median reference point in Activity Level RPI. The 
effects are estimated in partitions of initial performance (below median, 
third quartile, and above top quartile) from the main experiment.
This figure plots estimated effects on Δ Grade of providing the top-
quartile rather than median reference point in Grade RPI. The effects are 
estimated in partitions of initial performance (below median, third 
quartile, and above top quartile) from the supplemental experiment.
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Panel  A:  Sample  Selection
Total  Enrollment 24,554
        Exclude  Students  who  did  not  Access  the  Course 9,383
Final  Sample 15,171
Panel  B:  Descriptive  Statistics
N Mean Std.  Dev. 25% 75%
13,260 0.32 0.46 0 1
10,013 32.03 9.75 25 37
10,264 0.84 0.36 1 1
11,441 0.62 0.48 0 1
532 1.46 0.91 1 2
512 2.57 0.61 2 3
503 5.97 4.55 2 5
526 3.33 3.82 0 4
10,169 9.31 23.67 0 10
15,171 117.73 247.74 5 70
Gender
Age
Level  of  Education
Developed  Country
Familiarity  With  Subject  
Commitment  to  Complete  Course
Number  of  Online  Courses  Previously  Enrolled In 
Number  of  Online  Courses  Previously  Completed 
Grade
Activity  Level
Δ  Activity  Level 15,171 21.23 89.43 0 5
Table  1.  Sample  Selection  and  Descriptive  Statistics  for  Main  Experiment
This table shows the sample selection and descriptive statistics for the main experiment. Activity Level is the displayed 
measure of performance in RPI. Demographic data are missing for students who did not fill it in when asked in the 
registrations process and within the course. Grade is missing for students whose records were no longer in the course 
after we completed development of a code for accessing grade data. Grade is only provided in the main experiment 
for descriptive purposes. "Level of Education" is an indicator variable for an individual holding a bachelor's or higher 
degree. "Familiaritiy with Subject" is on an increasing scale of 0–4. "Commitment to Complete Course" is on an increasing 
scale of 1–3. This was a planned analysis.
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Total  Enrollment 28,057
        Exclude  Students  who  did  not  try  Graded  Content 23,597
Final  Sample 4,460
Panel  B:  Descriptive  Statistics
N Mean Std.  Dev. 25% 75%
3,902 0.30 0.45 0 1
3,772 30.62 28 24 35
3,857 0.81 0.38 1 1
4,367 0.64 0.47 0 1
2,242 1.57 0.97 1 2
2,404 2.16 0.92 2 3
2,221 3.44 3.75 1 5
2,221 1.86 2.86 0 2
4,460 222.43 230.17 11 354
4,460 94.05 122.40 10 146
4,460 9.40 36.74 0 0
588 0.28 0.33 0.12 0.38
4,460 21.65 28.95 1 34
Gender
Age
Level  of  Education
Developed  Country
Familiarity  With  Subject  
Commitment  to  Complete  Course
Number  of  Online  Courses  Previously  Enrolled In 
Number  of  Online  Courses  Previously  Completed 
Activity  Level
Problem  Attempts
Δ  Problem  Attempts
Problem-­‐‑Attempt  Accuracy
Grade
Δ  Grade 4,460 2.63 11.22 0 0
Table  2.  Sample  Selection  and  Descriptive  Statistics  for  Supplemental  Experiment
This   table   shows   the   sample   selection   and   descriptive   statistics   for   the   supplemental   experiment.   Grade is the 
displayed measure of performance in RPI.  Demographic  data  are  missing   for   students  who  did  not   fill   it   in  when  
asked  in  the  registration  process  and  within  the  course.  Level  of  Education  is  an  indicator  variable  for  an  individual  
holding   a   bachelor's   or   higher   degree.   "Familiarity   With   Subject"    is   on   an   increasing   scale   of   0–4.   "Commitment   
to   Complete   Course"   is   on   an   increasing   scale   of   1–3. This was an application to the supplemental experiment 
of a planned analysis for the main experiment. 
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Sample N
RPI
    Never  Accessed  RPI 9,752
    Accessed  RPI  Once 213
    Accessed  RPI  More  than  Once 367
RPI_M
    Never  Accessed  RPI 4,890
    Accessed  RPI  Once 108
    Accessed  RPI  More  than  Once 176
RPI_T
    Never  Accessed  RPI 4,862
    Accessed  RPI  Once 105
    Accessed  RPI  More  than  Once 191
Sample N
RPI
    Never  Accessed  RPI 2,214
    Accessed  RPI  Once 409
    Accessed  RPI  More  than  Once 372
RPI_M
    Never  Accessed  RPI 1,120
    Accessed  RPI  Once 203
    Accessed  RPI  More  than  Once 180
RPI_T
    Never  Accessed  RPI 1,120
    Accessed  RPI  Once 206
    Accessed  RPI  More  than  Once 192
Table  3.  RPI  Access  in  Main  Experiment
This   table   describes   the the distribution of RPI access in the main 
experiment. The table categorizes individuals by experimental 
condition. The differences in RPI access between the RPI_M and 
RPI_T groups are not statistically significant. This was a planned 
analysis.  
This table describes the distribution of RPI access in the 
supplemental experiment. The table categorizes individuals by 
experimental condition. The difference in RPI access between the 
RPI_M and RPI_T groups are not statistically significant. This was 
an application to the supplemental experiment of a planned 
analysis for the main experiment. 
Table  4.  RPI  Access  in  Supplemental  Experiment
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Control RPI_M RPI_T
Below  Median
10.78                        
(0.943)
16.43              
(0.463)
12.54              
(0.969)
Third  Quartile
16.02                  
(1.815)
16.48                    
(1.772)
24.96              
(3.452)
Above  Top  Quartile
36.27              
(2.514)
45.33                  
(3.376)
35.00
(2.980)
17.56 22.81 20.18
(0.934) (1.289) (1.207)
Table  5.  Cell  Means  Model  for  Main  Experiment
21.49
(0.884)
This	 table	 shows	 cell	 means	 for	 Δ	 Activity	 Level	 from	
the	main	 experiment.	 Cells	 are	 the	 nine	 categories	 from	
the	 matrix	 of	 initial	 performance	 (Below	 Median,	 Third	
Quartile,	 Above	 Top	Quartile)	 and	 experimental	 condition	
(Control,	 RPI_M,	 RPI_T).	 Each	 cell	 contains	 a	 coefficient	
from	 an	 OLS	 regression	 on	 	 Δ	 Activity	 Level	 of	 a	
categorical	variable	representing	an individual's	belonging	to	
the	cell.	Standard	errors	are	in	parentheses.	All	coefficients	
are	 statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 .01	 level. This model 
describes cells used in testing planned hypotheses.
c1	
c2	
c3
c4	
c5	
c6	
c7	
c8	
c9	
c1...3
	
c4...6
	
c7...9
	
c4...9
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Control RPI_M RPI_T
Below  Median
2.16                        
(0.297)
3.95              
(0.463)
2.95              
(0.381)
Third  Quartile
1.94                  
(0.484)
1.73                    
(0.509)
3.04              
(0.783)
Above  Top  Quartile
1.22              
(0.463)
0.65                  
(0.304)
1.98              
(0.539)
1.98 3.09 2.81
(0.225) (0.332) (0.300)
Table  6.  Cell  Means  Model  for  Supplemental  Experiment
2.95
(0.224)
This	 table	 shows	 cell	 means	 for	 Δ	 Grade	 from	 the	
supplemental	experiment.	Cells	are	the	nine	categories	from	
the	 matrix	 of	 initial	 performance	 (Below	 Median,	 Third	
Quartile,	 Above	 Top	 Quartile)	 and	 experimental	 condition	
(Control,	RPI_M,	RPI_T).		Each	cell	 contains	a	coefficient	
from	 an	 OLS	 regression	 on	 Δ	 Grade	 of	 a	 categorical	
variable	 representing	 an individual's	 belonging	 to	 the	 cell.	
Standard	 errors	 are	 in	 parentheses.	 All	 coefficients	 are	
statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 .01	 level. This model describes 
cells used in testing planned hypotheses from the main experiment, 
applied to the supplemental experiment. 
c1	
c2	
c3
c4	
c5	
c6	
c7	
c8	
c9	
c1...3
	
c4...6
	
c7...9
	
c4...9
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Coefficient Intercept Hypothesis Test  Statistic P-­‐‑Value
c1…3 17.65
c4...9 21.49
c4 16.43
c7 12.54
c5 16.48
c8 24.96
c6 45.33
c9 35.00
c7  &  9 -­‐‑4.86 c4  &  6
c8 7.43 c5
c7 -­‐‑3.71 c4
c8 7.43 c5
c8 7.43 c5
c9 -­‐‑6.57 c6
c4…6 14.34
c7…9 12.20
None
H2a0:  c4  =  c7                          
H2aA:  c4  >  c7
F  =  4.79** 0.028
Table  7.  Hypothesis  Tests  for  Main  Experiment
None
H10:  c1…3  =  c4…9                          
H1A:  c1…3  <  c4…9
F  =  5.12** 0.023
None
H2b0:  c5  =  c8                          
H2bA:  c5  <  c8
F  =  4.84** 0.027
None
H2c0:  c6  =  c9                          
H2cA:  c6  <  c9
F  =  2.45 0.117
              H3a0:  c7  &  9  =  c8            
H3aA:  c7  &  9  <  c8
χ2  =  11.13*** 0.000
H3b0:  c7  =  c8                           
H3bA:  c7  <  c8
χ2  =  9.09*** 0.002
This table shows hypothesis tests for the main experiment, with Δ Activity Level as the 
dependent variable. All tests include fixed effects for the experiment host course. The 
referenced cells are those from Table 5. The sample for each test consists of the cells compared 
in the hypothesis, along with the intercept cells, if any. F-tests compare Δ Activity Level in the 
RPI and control conditions, and in the top-quartile and median conditions. χ2-tests compare 
estimated effects on Δ Activity Level of providing the top-quartile rather than median 
reference point. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the .1, .05, and .01 levels, 
respectively. These models test planned hypotheses and yield effect estimates of the same 
magnitude that are significant at the same levels as those in OLS models from the approved 
proposal. We use the above model in the main text to more clearly link cells of treatment and 
initial performance to hypotheses, tests, and results.
H3c0:  c8  =  c9                           
H3cA:  c8  >  c9
χ2  =  7.46*** 0.006
None H0:  c4…6  =  c7...9                            F  =  1.75 0.185
Cells N
15,171
5,882
2,162
2,288
10,332
8,044
4,450
10,332
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Coefficient Intercept Hypothesis Test  Statistic P-­‐‑Value
c1…3 1.98
c4...9 2.95
c4 3.95
c7 2.95
c5 1.73
c8 3.04
c6 0.65
c9 1.98
c7  &  9 -­‐‑0.56 c4  &  6
c8 1.31 c5
c7 -­‐‑1.00 c4
c8 1.31 c5
c8 1.31 c5
c9 1.32 c6
c4…6 3.09
c7…9 2.81
Table  8.  Hypothesis  Tests  for  Supplemental  Experiment
F  =  0.37
F  =  4.59**
H3a0:  c7  &  9  =  c8                  
H3aA:  c7  &  9  <  c8
H3b0:  c7  =  c8                           
H3bA:  c7  <  c8
H3c0:  c8  =  c9                           
H3cA:  c8  >  c9
χ2  =  4.36**
χ2  =  0.00
None
None
None
None
H10:  c1…3  =  c4…9                          
H1A:  c1…3  <  c4…9
H2c0:  c6  =  c9                          
H2cA:  c6  <  c9
F  =  9.36***
This table shows the hypothesis tests for the main experiment, with Δ Grade as the dependent 
variable. The referenced cells are those from Table 6. The sample for each test consists of the 
cells compared in the hypothesis, along with the intercept cells, if any. F-tests compare 
Δ Grade in the RPI and control conditions, and in the top-quartile and median conditions. χ2-
tests compare estimated effects on Δ Activity Level of providing the top-quartile rather than 
median reference point. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the .1, .05, and .01 levels, 
respectively. These models test planned hypotheses for the main experiment, applied to the 
supplemental experiment, and yield effect estimates of the same magnitude that are 
significant at the same levels as those in OLS models from the approved proposal. We use the 
above model in the main text to more clearly link cells of treatment and initial performance to 
hypotheses, tests, and results.
H0:  c4…6  =  c7...9                           None
0.002
0.095
0.159
0.032
0.075
0.036
0.991
0.542
H2a0:  c4  =  c7                          
H2aA:  c4  >  c7
F  =  2.79*
F  =  1.98
H2b0:  c5  =  c8                          
H2bA:  c5  <  c8
Cells N
4,460
2,055
467
473
2,995
2,522
923
  2,995
χ
        2  =  3.15*
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Panel A: Survey Questions (the number of students selecting a response sits beside the response in parentheses)
1. Are you interested in seeing how your activity in the course compares to the...
no (16) yes (21)classmate median: 
classmate top quartile: no (22)
somewhat (20) 
somewhat (14) yes (21)
2. How important is it to you to be more active in the course than…
important (16)50% of your classmates: 
75% of your classmates:
not at all important (28)
not at all important (31)
somewhat important (15) 
somewhat important (15) important (13)
3. How confident are you in your ability to be more active in the course than…
confident (29)50% of your classmates: 
75% of your classmates:
not at all confident (7) 
not at all confident (11)
somewhat confident (20) 
somewhat confident (20) confident (25)
Panel B: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Comparisons of Survey Responses
Interest in viewing reference point
z-score: 2.12 in favor of median reference point
p-value: 0.033
N=57
Importance of reaching reference point
z-score: 1.89 in favor of median reference point
p-value: 0.057
N=59
Confidence in ability to reach reference point
z-score: 2.82 in favor of median reference point
p-value: 0.004
N=56
Table 9: Survey Responses and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Comparisons of Survey Responses for Main Experiment
This table shows survey questions and responses regarding individuals' opinions of the median and top-quartile 
reference points, as well as a comparison of responses. In comparing responses for each question, the least affirmative 
response is coded as 1, the intermediate response as 2, and the most affirmative response as 3. This was a planned 
supplemental analysis.
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Panel A: Survey Questions (the number of students selecting a response sits beside the response in parentheses)
1. Are you interested in seeing how your grade in the course compares to the...
no (6) yes (22)classmate median: 
classmate top quartile: no (6)
somewhat (13) 
somewhat (13) yes (22)
2. How important is it to you to get a higher grade in the course than…
important (16)50% of your classmates: 
75% of your classmates:
not at all important (13)
not at all important (14)
somewhat important (10) 
somewhat important (11) important (14)
3. How confident are you in your ability to get a higher grade in the course than…
confident (22)50% of your classmates: 
75% of your classmates:
not at all confident (5) 
not at all confident (8)
somewhat confident (12) 
somewhat confident (15) confident (16)
Panel B: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Comparisons of Survey Responses
Interest in viewing reference point
z-score: 0.00
p-value: 1.000
N=41
Importance of reaching reference point
z-score: 0.70 in favor of median reference point
p-value: 0.479
N=39
Confidence in ability to reach reference point
z-score: 2.49 in favor of median reference point
p-value: 0.012
N=39
Table 10: Survey Responses and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Comparisons of Survey Responses for Supplemental Experiment
This table shows survey questions and responses regarding individuals' opinions of the median and top-quartile 
reference points, as well as a comparison of responses. In comparing responses for each question, the least 
affirmative response is coded as 1, the intermediate response as 2, and the most affirmative response as 3. This was an 
application to the supplemental experiment of a planned supplemental analysis for the main experiment. 
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